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Abstract. In this paper, we propose a “bag of system calls” representa-
tion for intrusion detection in system call sequences and describe misuse
and anomaly detection results with standard machine learning techniques
on University of New Mexico (UNM) and MIT Lincoln Lab (MIT LL)
system call sequences with the proposed representation. With the feature
representation as input, we compare the performance of several machine
learning techniques for misuse detection and show experimental results
on anomaly detection. The results show that standard machine learning
and clustering techniques on simple “bag of system calls” representa-
tion of system call sequences is effective and often performs better than
those approaches that use foreign contiguous subsequences in detecting
intrusive behaviors of compromised processes.
1 Introduction
Detection of attempts to compromise the integrity, confidentiality, or availability
of computing and communication networks is an extremely challenging prob-
lem [1]. Most current approaches to the design of intrusion detection systems
(IDS) are based on the premise that the actions used in an attempted intrusion
can be differentiated from the actions executed by users or processes during the
normal operation of the computing and communication networks [2]. An effec-
tive IDS logs actions executed by users or processes for investigation, alerts the
system administrator when the monitored activities are indicative of attempted
intrusion, and, if appropriate, takes corrective measures e.g., expelling the in-
truder.
Intrusion detection and prevention generally refers to a broad range of strate-
gies for defending against malicious attacks. Intrusion detection can be catego-
rized into misuse detection and anomaly detection. Misuse typically is a known
attack, e.g., a hacker attempting to break into an email server in a way that
? Supported by NSF grant IIS 0219699.
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IDS has already trained. A misuse detection system tries to model normal and
abnormal behavior from known attacks. It works by comparing network traffic,
system call sequences, or other features of known attack patterns. An anomaly
is something out of the ordinary, e.g., abnormal network traffic which is actually
caused by unknown attacks. An anomaly detection system models normal be-
havior and identifies a behavior as abnormal (or anomalous) if it is sufficiently
different from known normal behaviors.
IDS can be classified into those that focus on modeling the behavior of users
and those that focus on modeling the behavior of processes [3]. System call
data are one of the most common types of data used to model the behavior of
processes. Such data can be collected by logging the system calls using operating
system utilities e.g. Linux strace or Solaris Basic Security Module (BSM).
There has been a great deal of research on how to design and implement in-
trusion detection systems. For example, Mukherjee et al [4] used a combination
of host monitors and network monitors with a centralized director for suspicious
system activities in the distributed intrusion detection system (DIDS) project.
Because it is difficult to manually specify activities that signal intrusive behav-
ior, there has been much work on adaptive or machine learning or data mining
approaches for intrusion detection. Forrest et al [5] worked on the Computer
Immunology project and explored approaches inspired by the activities of the
immune systems of animals for detecting and defending against intrusions. Sub-
sequently, several groups have explored data mining approaches for intrusion
detection [6–8].
In most IDS that model the behavior of processes, intrusions are detected
by observing fixed-length, contiguous subsequences of system calls. For example,
in anomaly detection, subsequences of input traces are matched against normal
sequences in database so that foreign sequences [5, 9] are detected. One potential
drawback of this approach is that the size of the database that contains fixed-
length contiguous subsequences increases exponentially with the length of the
subsequences. For example, if the number of system calls is 200 and the length of
the subsequences is 6, the size of the database is theoretically 2006 = 64×1012. In
practice, only normal subsequences are stored, so actual database size is smaller,
but still considerably bigger than the hypothesis size generated by our approach.
In this paper, we explore an alternative representation of system call traces
for intrusion detection. Specifically, we use a bag of system calls representation of
system call sequences. In other words, we consider intrusion detection of system
call sequence as a classification problem on a bag of system calls obtained from
the system call sequences. With those problem setting, we constructed and eval-
uated decision tree [10], Naive Bayes [11], decision list [12, 13], Support Vector
Machines (SVM) [14, 15], and Logistic Regression (with a ridge estimator) [16]
classifiers using bag of system calls representation of system calls for misuse de-
tection. We also explored an approach to anomaly detection using a one class
Naive Bayes classifier as well as K-means clustering [17] using the same repre-
sentation of system call sequences. Bag of words model is already popular in text
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classification and categorization area [18], and our motivation is to investigate
the usefulness of the model in intrusion detection tasks.
The results show that the proposed approach for misuse detection yields com-
parable or sometimes better performance than the methods previously reported
in the literature in terms of detection rate and false positive over widely used
benchmark data sets such as University of New Mexico (UNM) and MIT Lincoln
Lab (MIT LL) system call sequences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes two different
representations of system call sequences. Section 3 describes the benchmark data
sets used in our study. Section 4 describes the experimental setup and results.
Section 5 concludes with a summary and discussion.
2 Alternative Representations of System Call Sequences
We describe two feature representations of system call sequences that intrusion
detection algorithms deal with. The first one is a contiguous subsequence with
fixed length k from original input traces, and the second is bag of system calls,
which is our approach.
One of the main questions in sequence-based intrusion detection is how to
define “intrusion” in an input sequence. Most intrusion detection algorithms such
as STIDE [19] regard that intrusion is related with fixed-length subsequence that
only happens in intrusive traces.
In our approach, we convert the input sequence to bag of system calls. Thus,
the ordering information between system calls is lost and only the frequency of
each system call is preserved for each input sequence. Intrusion is represented
according to the machine learning algorithm applied.
Formally, the intrusion detection problem on system call or command se-
quences can be defined as follows:
Let Σ = {s1, s2, s3, . . . , sm} be a set of system calls where m = |Σ| is the
number of system calls. Data set D can be defined as a set of labeled sequences
{< Zi, ci > |Zi ∈ Σ∗, ci ∈ {0, 1}} where Zi is an input sequence and ci is a
corresponding class label denoting 0 for “normal” label and 1 for “intrusion”
label. Given the data set D, the goal of the learning algorithm is to find a clas-
sifier h : Σ∗ → {0, 1} that maximizes given criteria. Such criteria are accuracy,
detection rate and false positive rate.
Since it is difficult to deal with sequences directly, each sequence Z ∈ Σ∗
is mapped into a finite dimensional feature vector by a feature representation
Φ : Σ∗ → X. Thus, the classifier is defined as h : X → {0, 1} for data set
{< Xj , cj > |X ∈ X, cj ∈ {0, 1}}.
2.1 Contiguous Foreign Subsequences
In this approach, a feature is defined as Xj = x1x2x3. . .xl, a substring of Zi,
where xk∈Σ and l is a constant. The number of possible features is
∣∣Σl∣∣ ≥ j and
each feature Xj is assigned a class label ci according to the original sequence Zi.
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STIDE uses sliding windows with length l over an original input trace to
generate fixed-length substrings as features and constructs a database of the
features in the training stage, and decides a test sequence is anomalous if the
number of mismatches in the user-specified locality frame (locality frame count),
which is composed of adjacent features in the frame, is more than the user-
specified threshold. Empirically, it is widely accepted that, for effective intrusion
detection, the minimal value of k is six [20].
2.2 Bag of System Calls
“Bag of system calls” representation is an integer-frequency based method. In
our approach, a feature is defined as an ordered list Xi = 〈c1, c2, c3, . . ., cm〉
where m = |Σ| and cj is the number of occurrence of system call sj in the input
sequence Zi.
Thus, the original trace is converted to a bag of system calls, and the ordering
information of adjacent system calls in the input sequence is lost and only the
frequency of each system call in the bag is preserved. Intrusion in this feature
representation is defined according to the machine learning algorithm applied.
One of the main issues in this paper is whether the bag of system calls repre-
sentation, which is already popular in text classification and categorization, can
effectively represent intrusion. We will show experimental results over University
of New Mexico (UNM) and Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Lab
(MIT LL) data in later sections for this issue. It will be shown that frequency
information is effective enough to discriminate between normal sequences and
abnormal sequences. As an example for this, figure 1 shows a histogram of the
average frequency of selected system calls in normal sequences and abnormal
sequences in UNM denial of service (DoS) trace data set (also known as stide
data set). We found a similar phenomenon for other data sets including MIT LL
data sets.
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Fig. 1. Average frequency of selected system calls in normal traces and intrusion traces
in UNM denial of service trace data set
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Table 1. The number of original traces and generated sequences in UNM data sets
Program # of original traces # of sequences
live lpr (normal) 1232 1232
live lpr (exploit) 1001 1001
live lpr MIT (normal) 2704 2704
live lpr MIT (exploit) 1001 1001
synthetic sendmail (normal) 7 346
synthetic sendmail (exploit) 10 25
synthetic sendmail CERT (normal) 2 294
synthetic sendmail CERT (exploit) 6 34
denial of service (normal) 13726 13726
denial of service (exploit) 1 105
3 Data Sets
For experiments, we choose publicly available system call sequences from UNM
and MIT LL data.
3.1 UNM System System Call Sequences
The University of New Mexico (UNM) provides a number of system call data
sets. The data sets we tested are “live lpr”, “live lpr MIT”, “synthetic sendmail”,
“synthetic sendmail CERT”, and “denial of service”(DoS).
In UNM system call traces, each trace is an output of one program. Some-
times, one trace has multiple processes. In such cases, we have made one sequence
per process in the original trace. Thus, multiple sequences of system calls are
made from one trace if the input trace has multiple processes in it. However,
most traces have only one process and usually one sequence is created for each
trace. Table 1 shows the number of original traces and the number of sequences
for each program.
There are three different mapping files in UNM call traces. One is Sun
(synthetic sendmail, synthetic sendmail CERT, synthetic lpr, live lpr and live
lpr.MIT) , another is Linux (live named, login, ps, inet and DoS), and the third
is new Linux (synthetic ftp and xlock). There are old and new Sun mapping files
but only one system call is added to the new mapping file so both can be easily
converted. The Sun mapping file has a few duplicate system calls (e.g. ‘fstat’,
‘stat’, etc.), but we changed them so that each system call is unique.
3.2 MIT Lincoln Lab System Call Sequences
MIT Lincoln Lab provides evaluation data on its website. The fourth week (start-
ing at 6/22/98) training data set of year 1998 is used for the experiments in this
paper. This training data is comprised of a detailed set of data files representing
the state of a particular system over eight-hour daytime periods over the course
of the week beginning on 6/22/98. Of interest to this paper is the omnibus data
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file containing all system calls made during the collection period and the net-
work traffic analysis file (distilled from raw network data) that identifies inbound
network connection attempts.
We explain the issues with cross-indexing the data files. MIT Lincoln Labs
datasets included an omnibus file containing all system call traces along with
a separate, network traffic analysis data file indicating inbound network con-
nections to the system. Attack attempts are logged with the network data, so
labeling of the training data requires cross-indexing this file with the system call
trace file. The system call trace file identifies the source of each call using the
process ID. Therefore, cross-indexing requires tracking the argument to the ‘exec’
system call identifying the binary to be executed. Additionally, the timestamps
from the network traffic analyzer do not exactly correspond to the execution
timestamps from the operating system kernel. A tolerance of one second was
arbitrarily chosen and seems to permit the matching of a large majority of con-
nection attempts with their corresponding server processes run on the target
system.
All processes detected that do not correspond to some network connection
attempt identified in the trace are removed from consideration (since they cannot
be classified), as are all calls attributed to a process ID for which an ‘exec’ system
call is not found.
4 Experiments and Results
We use different approaches for three different types of intrusion detection ex-
periments. The approaches will be explained at each respective section.
The data sets we have tested are “live lpr”, “live lpr MIT”, “synthetic send-
mail”, “synthetic sendmail CERT”, and “denial of service attack” of UNM, and
the fourth week training data set of year 1998 in MIT LL.
For the evaluation of classifiers generated in the experiment, 10-fold cross
validation is used, so no training information is reused in the test stage. In ‘x’-
fold cross-validation, the data set is divided into x subsets of approximately
equal size. One of the subsets is picked for testing and the rest subsets are used
for training. In other words, a classifier is generated from ‘x-1’ subsets and the
classifier is tested over the rest subset. This routine is applied for each of x
different subsets, and then accuracy, detection rate and false positive rate are
averaged respectively over each of x different subsets tested. This is to ensure
that no information used for classifier generation is reused as test data.
Accuracy, detection rate, and false positive rate are defined as follows:
accuracy =
# of true positives + # of true negatives
# of input sequences
detection rate =
# of true positives
# of true positives + # of false negatives
false positive rate =
# of false positives
# of true positives + # of false positives
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4.1 Experimental Results on Misuse Detection
For misuse detection, we use several machine learning techniques. We tested
Naive Bayes Multinomial [11], C4.5 [10], RIPPER [13], SVM [14, 15] (with two
class labels), and Logistic Regression. For SVM, Sequential Minimal Optimiza-
tion (SMO) [15] with a linear kernel was used for training, and for logistic re-
gression, a multinomial logistic regression model with a ridge estimator [16] was
used. Table 2 shows the accuracy, detection rate, and false positive rate of the
data sets we tested. The detection rate is a fraction of the intrusions identified
and the false positive rate is a fraction of normal data mis-identified as intrusion.
The results in table 2 show that standard machine learning techniques are
effective in misuse detection with simple bag of system calls representation. For
example, with SMO using a linear kernel, an SVM can perfectly detect both
normal and intrusion sequences in the “UNM live lpr” data set.
In the MIT LL results in table 2, it is interesting that all machine learning
algorithms got the same results on each day tested. We did not try to detect
the type of intrusion and assign a corresponding score for the intrusion as was
intended in the original evaluation in 1998. Instead we just tried to detect intru-
sion. Perhaps, the reason that all algorithms have the same results for each day
is that the normal sequences and intrusion sequences in the data set are already
highly different. Wednesday data set was not tested because no intrusions were
in the network traffic analysis file.
One problem is that the machine learning algorithms will not work well when
data is not quite balanced, which is common in intrusion detection practice. For
example, “UNM synthetic sendmail” and “UNM synthetic sendmail CERT” data
sets in the table are such data sets, and that’s why their detection rate or false
positive rate is not quite optimal. There are several ways to deal with this imbal-
anced data problem. Here, we use a cost matrix which assigns different weights
for each misclassification. Figure 2 shows the Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) Curve of “UNM live lpr” and “UNM synthetic sendmail” data sets using
C4.5 and Naive Bayes Multinomial algorithms respectively.
From figure 2(a), we can see that the classifier generated from “UNM live lpr”
data set is very effective because it has sufficient number of intrusion data for
training. The “UNM live lpr” data set has 183 attributes, 1232 normal sequences,
and 1001 intrusion sequences. From figure 2(b), standard machine learning tech-
niques have limitations in this case, because the data sets themselves are small.
The “UNM synthetic sendmail” data set has 182 attributes, 346 normal se-
quences, and only 25 intrusion sequences. Since we tested the algorithm with 10
fold cross-validation, in some folds, the algorithm did not have enough intrusion
samples.
4.2 Detecting intrusion from the generated rules
One of the problems in our bag of system calls representation is that, with some
machine learning algorithms, the classification cannot be done until the end of
the process [19]. However, with the machine learning algorithms that generate
8 Dae-Ki Kang et al.
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Fig. 2. ROC Curve of “UNM live lpr” and “UNM synthetic sendmail” data sets in
misuse detection
comprehensive hypotheses, we can use very simple rules to detect a process that
has exhibited intrusive behavior before it is terminated.
Figure 3 is the decision tree by C4.5 for the “UNM live lpr” data set.
fstat
normal (1234.0/2.0)
<= 5
intrusion (999.0)
> 5
Fig. 3. C4.5 decision tree for UNM live lpr
Though this simple rule does not have a perfect detection rate, it says that
“we can guess the input lpr program trace is an intrusion sequence if the num-
ber of occurrences of ‘fstat’ system calls is more than 5”. Therefore, a simple
counter program that counts the number of certain system calls can detect intru-
sion before the process ends. However, unlike the approach that detects foreign
contiguous subsequences, the counter program may not detect intrusion just
after foreign subsequences are executed.
Figure 4 is the decision tree produced by C4.5 for “UNM live lpr MIT”
data set. Though both the “UNM live lpr” data and the “UNM live lpr MIT”
data contain intrusion snapshots by “lprcp” scripts, the generated rule may not
always be the same because of different system environments.
The reason that this difference in frequency matters in classification is that
the programs compromised by the intruder will have more codes (intrusion codes)
which will be executed during the routine execution of the programs, causing a
change in the distribution of system calls. In the decision trees of figure 3 and 4, it
can be seen that intrusion lies under ‘greater than (>)’ arc. It is because adding
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unlink
normal (2669.0/1.0)
<= 2
getuid
> 2
normal (33.0)
<= 1
intrusion (1003.0/3.0)
> 1
Fig. 4. C4.5 decision tree for UNM live lpr MIT
intrusion codes in the original program increases the counts of those system calls
(‘fstat’, ‘unlink’, and ‘getuid’) in the decision trees.
Figure 5 shows the decision tree produced by C4.5 for multiple intrusions. The
intrusions are “inted”, “denial of service attack”, “ps”, “login”, and “named” in
UNM data. The figure indicates that this kind of decision tree can be an intrusion
detector for composite attacks.
4.3 Experimental Results on Supervised Anomaly Detection
For supervised anomaly detection, we used one class Naive Bayes algorithm. In
one class Naive Bayes, we calculate the probability distribution of the training
data instead of the class label conditional probability distribution. For test se-
quences, we calculated symmetric Kullback-Liebler divergence [21, 22] between
the learned distribution and the distribution of test sequence in bag of system
calls representation. If the divergence is under a user-specified threshold θ, then
the test sequence is considered to be similar to the learned distribution.
In figure 6, we show the result of the one class Naive Bayes algorithm in
a bag of system calls representation on “UNM live lpr” and “UNM synthetic
sendmail” data.
One class Naive Bayes performs effectively on the “UNM live lpr” data set,
but does not perform effectively on “UNM synthetic sendmail” data with a bag
of system calls representation. It is not surprising considering that two class
Naive Bayes Multinomial does not work well either.
4.4 Experimental Results on Unsupervised Anomaly Detection
In unsupervised anomaly detection, the learning algorithm assumes that the
input data set is composed of normal sequences and intrusion sequences. There-
fore, it assumes the data distribution is a mixture of the distribution of normal
seqeunces and the intrusion seqeunces. We use k-Means clustering with k set to
2 for clustering normal and intrusion distributions. We evaluated the clustering
based approach on “UNM live lpr” and “UNM synthetic sendmail” data. The
results are shown in table 3.
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close
open
<= 7
read
> 7
normal (25.0/7.0)
<= 7
write
> 7
normal (2.0/1.0)
<= 45
DoS (103.0)
> 45
inetd (30.0/1.0)
<= 4
getuid
> 4
munmap
<= 1
chdir
> 1
ioctl
<= 3
normal (13759.0/5.0)
> 3
getdents
<= 1
ps (3.0/1.0)
> 1
brk
<= 2
read
> 2
normal (15.0/5.0)
<= 4
ps (2.0)
> 4
normal (3.0)
<= 91
ps (5.0/1.0)
> 91
execve
<= 0
alarm
> 0
mmap
<= 0
named (2.0)
> 0
stat
<= 10
ps (8.0)
> 10
ps (2.0)
<= 26
normal (4.0/1.0)
> 26
login (6.0)
<= 2
open
> 2
normal (12.0/1.0)
<= 55
login (3.0/1.0)
> 55
Fig. 5. C4.5 decision tree for multiple intrusions in Linux from UNM data
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From the results in the table, k-means clustering is effective in unsupervised
anomaly detection on ‘UNM live lpr’ data but not on ‘UNM synthetic sendmail’
data. Hence, there is a need for more sophisticated approaches for unsupervised
anomaly detection.
5 Summary and Discussion
In this paper, we have explored the use of a simple bag of system calls represen-
tation of system call sequences for intrusion detection. We constructed decision
tree, Naive Bayes, decision list, and SVM and Logistic Regression classifiers for
misuse detection. We constructed one class Naive Bayes algorithm and K-Means
clustering for anomaly detection. In addition to the fact that we can use those
standard machine learning methods, the proposed ‘bag of system calls’ repre-
sentation has significant computational advantages over other approaches that
have been reported in the literature.
Results of our experiments using widely used benchmark data sets - the
University of New Mexico (UNM) and MIT Lincoln Lab (MIT LL) system call
sequences show that the performance of the proposed approach in terms of de-
tection rate and false positive rate is comparable or superior to that of previously
reported data mining approaches to misuse detection. In particular, as shown
in table 2, the proposed methods achieve nearly 100% detection rate with al-
most 0% false positive rate on all the data sets studied with the exception of
two synthetic data sets (‘UNM synthetic sendmail’ and ‘UNM synthetic send-
mail CERT’). It is important to note that the reported performance measures
were estimated using 10 fold cross-validation which ensures no overlap between
training data and test data.
5.1 Discussion
When compared with the widely used fixed-length contiguous subsequence mod-
els, the bag of system calls representation explored in this paper may seem some-
what simple. It may be argued that much more sophisticated models that take
into account the identity of the user or perhaps the order in which the calls were
made. But our experiments show that a much simpler approach may be adequate
in many scenarios. The results of experiments described in this paper show that
it is possible to achieve nearly perfect detection rates and false positive rates
using a data representation that discards the relationship between system call
and originating process as well as the sequence structure of the calls within the
traces.
Forrest et. al. [5, 19] showed that it is possible to achieve accurate anom-
aly detection using fixed-length contiguous subsequence representation of input
data. In their approach, the detector will find anomalous subsequences right af-
ter they are executed depending on user-specified thresholds. The proposed ‘bag
of system calls representation has advantages that learning is faster, memory
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requirements are significantly lower, and simple counter program can discrimi-
nate normal sequences and abnormal sequences very quickly, before the process
is terminated.
5.2 Related Work
Warrender, Forrest, and Pearlmutter [19] have presented several intrusion de-
tection methods based upon system call trace data. They tested a method that
utilizes sliding windows to determine a database of normal sequences to form
a database for testing against test instances. They then used a similar method
to compare windows in the test instances against the database and classify in-
stances according to a function of the similarity of these sequences to those in the
normal sequence database. The function requires sequential analysis of a window
of system calls for each call made by a process. This requires the maintenance
of a large database of normal system call trace sequences.
The same authors have described a rule-based classification method that re-
quires alterations to the training data to learn. This model involves prediction of
the next system call to be made by a process given some number of calls made
immediately before. This method requires enumeration of all unique system call
traces within a given program. This is quite demanding on a learner, especially
in a situation where the datasets are quite large indeed. Even the space require-
ments are quite large relative to the input dataset. Finally, classification time is
high for such methods because (in the worst case) each rule needs to be checked
for each input instance.
Warrender et al. have presented Hidden Markov Model (HMM) methods for
intrusion detection. Although this method does not require modification of the
input dataset, it does require individual examination of each dataset to determine
the optimal HMM to attempt to learn in each case. While this requirement does
not seem overly demanding, we would prefer a method which allows classification
of multiple input datasets in the same format if possible. Additionally construc-
tion of accurate HMM models can be quite demanding in terms the amount of
training data as well as computational effort. Warrender, et al. observe that, for
a process that makes S system calls, S states (and thus 2S2 values) must be
computed. Datasets of interest in practice contain large amounts of processes
(eight hours per day worth in the case of the MIT Lincoln Labs datasets), and
each process makes a large number of system calls throughout its lifetime. Com-
puting even polynomially many values for each instance becomes a problem at
this scale.
Normalized frequency of audit data was used in SRI NIDES [23]. In NIDES,
probability distribution of long term behavior of a program is generated and
maintained as its profile. For detecting the anomalous behavior of the program,
the profile is compared with short term behavior of the program, which is also
maintained as probability distribution, using a statistical test similar to χ2 test.
The behavior of a program is characterized by its audit data such as file access,
CPU usage, etc. We maintain the raw count of system calls that are sequentially
observed from the program as its profile, but this approach can be applied to
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other types of audit data. In some machine learning algorithms, raw counts
are normalized and statistically compared with new behavior of the program.
The Naive Bayes learning algorithm, which is one of the learning algorithms
reported in this study, generates class-conditional probability distributions and
prior distributions of the raw counts and statistically compares them with new
distribution from the new behavior of the program. Moreover, as we showed,
our profile representation can be used effectively with various machine learning
algorithms.
One of the most popular rule induction techniques used in IDS is Repeated
Incremental Pruning to Produce Error Reduction (RIPPER) rule learning algo-
rithm [13]. Lee et al. [24] used RIPPER on a set of substrings of length 7 gen-
erated by the sliding window from sendmail system call traces. The generated
rules are based on the insight that intrusion can be captured from the fixed-
length substrings. For example, the rule ‘normal: p2 = 104, p7 = 112’ means ‘if
p2 is 104 and p7 is 112 then the substring is normal’. This approach, as in the
case of STIDE, employs a user-supplied threshold to determine if the input trace
is normal or intrusive. We applied RIPPER on a bag of system calls represen-
tation, and we obtained rules based on counts such as ‘(count(fcntl) ≥ 1) and
(count(rename) ≤ 0) and (count(read) ≥ 5) → class=intrusion’ where count(X)
returns the number of occurrence of system call X in the input trace. The rules
generated by our method apply to the entire system call trace (as opposed to
fixed length substring of traces). In our case, the relevant thresholds are learned
directly from the training data, thereby avoiding the necessity of user-supplied
thresholds.
5.3 Future Work
Some directions for future work include:
– Extending the supervised anomaly detection experiments with one-class sup-
port vector machines [25–28] or other anomaly detection techniques in SVM [29].
– Extending feature representation so that subsequences rather than system
calls can be dealt with by the existing machine learning techniques in an
efficient way. We believe it will show better performance in terms of accu-
racy/detection rate/false positive rate in supervised anomaly detection.
– Modeling multiple processes’ behavior in one trace. Current intrusion detec-
tion system assumes one process produce intrusions in the intrusion model.
Modeling multiple processes that are cooperative is more probable for future
intrusion detection system.
– Performing experiments on different operating system such as Microsoft
Windows. Anomaly detection of spyware in Windows is a good example.
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Table 2. Percentage of misuse detection based on 10 fold cross-validation
Program Naive Bayes C4.5 RIPPER SVM Logistic
Multinomial Regression
UNM live lpr
accuracy 83.43 99.91 99.91 100.00 99.91
detection rate 100.00 99.80 99.80 100.00 100.00
false positive rate 30.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16
UNM live lpr MIT
accuracy 54.52 99.89 99.86 99.83 99.97
detection rate 100.00 99.90 99.80 99.80 99.90
false positive rate 62.31 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.00
UNM synthetic sendmail
accuracy 20.21 94.87 94.33 95.68 95.41
detection rate 92.00 40.00 48.00 40.00 64.00
false positive rate 84.97 1.15 2.31 0.28 2.31
UNM synthetic sendmail CERT
accuracy 24.39 96.64 95.42 96.03 96.03
detection rate 100.00 85.29 82.35 64.70 82.35
false positive rate 84.35 2.04 3.06 0.34 2.38
UNM denial of service
accuracy 98.70 99.97 99.96 99.98 99.97
detection rate 44.76 99.04 98.09 100.00 99.04
false positive rate 0.88 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
MIT LL 1998 4th Week
Monday
accuracy 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
detection rate 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
false positive rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tuesday
accuracy 99.55 99.55 99.55 99.55 99.55
detection rate 98.60 98.60 98.60 98.60 98.60
false positive rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Thursday
accuracy 99.73 99.73 99.73 99.73 99.73
detection rate 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
false positive rate 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Friday
accuracy 98.80 98.80 98.80 98.80 98.80
detection rate 89.28 89.28 89.28 89.28 89.28
false positive rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 3. K-means clustering results of unsupervised anomaly detection experiments
in percentage.
Program Accuracy Detection Rate False Positive
UNM live lpr 99.28 100.00 1.29
UNM synthetic sendmail 80.3235 40.00 16.76
